题目：Should the Seller Adopt Consumer Credit on E-commerce Platform?
This paper studies the incentive of adopting consumer credit in a supply chain with a monopolistic manufacturer selling to a large market through an online platform. The market consists of both the capital-sufficient consumers and the capital-constraint consumers who have to purchase with the consumer credit. We consider both the agency channel and the reselling channel in the relationship between the manufacturer and the platform. In order to expand the demand, the seller in the supply chain may adopt the consumer-bearing credit or the consumer-free credit. In the agency channel, the manufacturer as the seller has an incentive to adopt the consumer-free credit when the interest rate is low, the consumer-bearing credit when the interest rate is moderate, and no consumer credit when the interest rate is high. The manufacturer has more incentive to adopt the consumer credit when either the commission rate is lower or the proportion of capital-constraint consumers becomes larger. In the reselling channel, the platform as the seller always has an incentive to adopt the consumer-free credit. And when the interest rate is low, the platform also has incentive to choose the consumer-bearing credit. When the seller uses the consumer-bearing credit, we find that higher interest rate decreases the demand in the agency channel but increases the demand in the reselling channel.
Shilu Tong is an Associate Professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen. He received his Ph.D. degree in Operations Management from the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and his B.S. and M.S. degrees from Fudan University. He was previously a faculty member at the University of New South Wales. His research interests focus on the issues of contracting, information sharing and competition in supply chain management, and the interface between marketing and operations.
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